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Abstract This article argues that there is a natural solution to carry out interper-
sonal comparisons of utility when the theory of gambles is supplemented with a group
operation of joint receipts. If so, three types of people can exist, and the two types
having multiplicative representations of joint receipt have, in contrast to most utility
theories, absolute scales of utility. This makes possible, at least in principle, mean-
ingful interpersonal comparisons of utility with desirable properties, thus resolving a
long standing philosophical problem and having potentially important implications in
economics. Two behavioral criteria are given for the three classes of people. At this
point the relative class sizes are unknown.
Keywords Interpersonal comparison of utility · Joint receipt · p-Additive utility ·
Welfare economics · Weighted utility
Both the economic and philosophic literatures have focussed some discussion on the
issue of interpersonal comparisons of utility. With some exceptions, the consensus of
many seems to be that we do not have fully satisfactory ways to justify such com-
parisons. Robbins (1938) argued, very discursively, that such comparisons simply
cannot be made. Narens and Luce (1983) showed their impossibility in an ordinal
context. Hammond (1991) is especially forceful in the position that, using standard
utility theories, no such comparisons are possible, whereas Nozick (1985) claimed that
they can be made by equating kinks in the utility functions. Nonetheless, in practice,
welfare (not utility per se) comparisons are attempted both at the individual level, as in
discussions of family compromises, and at the social level in welfare economics with-
out directly invoking utility. Detailed discussions may be found in Harsanyi (1977),
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Elster and J. Roemer (1991), List (2003), and Binmore (2009) who provides a brief
but useful summary. The fundamental point is that for ratio and interval scales, there
is no principled way to choose what are “equal” units of utility for different people.
These difficulties, of course, raise huge theoretical problems for welfare economics
that do not seem to have been effectively resolved.
In this article, a new approach is explored which is based on the idea that not only do
gambles have representations that involve both addition and multiplication, but also so
should the representations of joint receipts which are assumed to interlock with gam-
bles in a fully rational fashion (segregation, (9)). This leads to representations which
turn out to have three quite distinct forms. One is additive over joint receipts, which
really is the classical case, and the resulting scale is a ratio one for which interpersonal
comparisons are impossible. The other two differ in having, instead, multiplicative
representations that are absolute scales. For these two sub-cases, I propose a simple
hypothesis as to what such an interpersonal comparison means and arrive at a few of
its elementary properties.
It should be added that these ideas by no means solve the issues of social welfare
comparisons, although they may lay the ground work for a new approach to it. This
remains to be seen.
1 p-Additive representations
Suppose that X is the set of consequences under consideration, that  is a weak (pref-
erence) order over X, and that ⊕ is a binary operation (of joint receipt) on X. As
usual, x ∼ y means both x  y and y  x . Because the indifference relation ∼ is an
equivalence relation, we are in reality working with equivalence classes, for which we
assume that 〈X, e,⊕,∼〉 satisfies the usual axioms of an Abelian (weakly commu-
tative) group with identity e. Moreover, we assume that 〈X, e,⊕,〉 on equivalence
classes is a solvable, Archimedean-ordered, Abelian group with an isomorphism onto
the additive real numbers. For the equivalence classes, the operation ⊕ is closed, has
an identity, is commutative and associative, and each element has an inverse satisfying
the usual axioms of a solvable, Archimedean-ordered, Abelian group (Hölder 1901;
Krantz et al. 1971, Chaps. 2 and 3).
Examples of joint receipt are ubiquitous, e.g., choosing two commodities, such as
steak and a can of soup, at a store. As we are all aware, steak is an uncertain alter-
native, whereas a can of soup is highly standard and is often treated as without risk
or uncertainty. The steak can be imbedded in X by invoking its certainty equivalent.
Another familiar example is receiving a check and a bill in the mail. Both examples
generalize to any finite size bundles because the operation is associative.
Instead of investigating the representations into the real numbers R under just addi-
tion, 〈R,≥,+〉, as is usually done, let us suppose, as is true of theories for uncertain
alternatives that the representations of ⊕ are onto suitable (defined below) subinter-
vals of 〈R,≥,+,×〉 that are closed under addition and multiplication. Under standard
assumptions, the only one consistent with Hölder’s axioms has the form
U∗(x ⊕ y) = U∗(x) + U∗(y) + δ∗U∗(x)U∗(y) (1)
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(Luce 2000, p. 152). The form (1) is called a p-additive (p for polynomial) utility
representation because it with δ∗ = 0 is the only polynomial form with U∗(e) = 0
that can be transformed into an additive representation (by the logarithm of (7) below).
Note that for the representation (1) to make dimensional sense when δ∗ = 0, the
unit of δ∗ must be the unit of (U∗)−1, i.e., that δ∗U∗ is dimensionless in those cases.
So we define
δ := sgn(δ∗), (2)
i.e., the sign of δ∗, and for δ = 0
U := ∣∣δ∗∣∣U∗. (3)
So, U is dimensionless when δ = −1 or 1. The notations U and δ are used from now
on.
1.1 Representations for δ = 0 and δ = 0
For the case δ = 0, the U representation corresponding to (1) simplifies to the purely
additive form
U (x ⊕ y) = U (x) + U (y), (4)
and the utility of both the gains and losses are unbounded because n iterations of x,
denoted nx, has U (nx) = nU (x). Moreover, the additive case is of ratio scale type
because e is the identity of ⊕.
For δ = 0, we may rewrite (1) in terms of U as
1 + δU (x ⊕ y) = [1 + δU (x)] [1 + δU (y)] , (5)
where, now, δ = −1 or 1. Ng et al. (2009) examine these cases, showing that under
the conditions needed to prove results below, for δ = 1, U maps onto ]− 1
δ
,∞[ =
]−1,∞[ which simply means that the utility for gains (x  e) is (subjectively)




[ = ]−∞, 1[ so the disutility of losses is (subjectively) unbounded
whereas that for gains is bounded.
This means that to the degree that the axioms justifying the representation are sat-
isfied, we may expect people to fall into one of three quite distinct categories with
inherently different non-linear forms. (A fourth category with both bounded gains
and bounded losses is mentioned in Appendix 5.1.) A major empirical implication of
these facts is that it is very unwise to average data from people who have not been
pre-screened for, at least, type. This is because when one averages inherently different
functions, that average function may well be unlike any of it components (see Fig. 1).
Therefore, one needs, at a minimum, to ascertain to which of the three types each
person belongs, which is taken up in Sect. 1.3.
123
8 R. D. Luce














































Fig. 1 Panel a U = 1 − x−αx (α = 1); Panel b U = eβx − 1(β = 1). Panel c Average of Panels a and b.
Panel d 9 : 1 average of Panels a and b. Panel e Zoom in on region near x = 0 of Panel c. Panel f Zoom in
on region near x = 1.1, the inflexion point, of Panel d
Observe that for δ = 0, the transformation
V (x) := 1 + δU (x), (6)
which is referred to as a value representation, is an absolute scale because U, and so
δU , is absolute. The V scale maps onto ]0,∞[ in both non-zero cases. The difference
being that V is order preserving for δ = 1 and order reversing for δ = −1. Moreover,
we see that together (5) and (6) yield the multiplicative representation
V (x ⊕ y) = V (x)V (y). (7)
Note that no scale factor α = 1 maintains the multiplicative representation, (7). In
general, such a multiplicative representation is unique only up to an arbitrary power,
but as we shall see even that degree of freedom is lost.
123
Interpersonal comparisons of utility for 2 of 3 types of people 9
1.2 Binary uncertain gambles
Let x and y be consequences from X , and let C and D be disjoint chance events arising
in a family of chance “experiments.” A binary uncertain alternative—often, although
somewhat misleadingly, called a gamble, the term which I will use—is based on an
experiment whose “universal set” may be partitioned into C and D. Each sub-event
leads to its own consequence, so that the gamble has two chance branches (x, C) and
(y, D). We write it as (x, C; y, D).
For x  y, observe that over the equivalence classes
x ⊕ y−1 = z ⇔ x = z ⊕ y. (8)
Two key assumptions linking the representations arising from joint receipt and those
from the gambling structure are:
Segregation:
(x ⊕ y−1, C; e, D) ⊕ y ∼ (x, C; y, D). (9)
Segregation seems highly rational: On the left the consequences are (x ⊕ y−1)⊕ y = x
if C occurs and e ⊕ y = y if D occurs, and the right of course yields exactly the same
thing.
Separability: The set of so-called unitary gambles of gains, those of the form (x, C; e,
D), where x  e, satisfies a version of the axioms of conjoint structure on X × B,
where B is the algebra of events. A formal axiomatization was given by Marley and
Luce (2002) for gains (and losses), but for present purposes all that is really needed is
(10) below.
For the case δ = 0, Luce (2000, Theorem 4.4.4) shows that under certain density
assumptions, segregation, and separability, that there is a ratio scale utility function
U over gains, x  e, and a subjective weighting function SC∪D with the following
properties. U and SC∪D are onto intervals and
U (x, C; e, D) = U (x)SC∪D(C) (x  e). (10)
By segregation one obtains for any x, y ∈ X with x  y,
U (x, C; y, D) = U (x)SC∪D(C) + U (y) [1 − SC∪D(C)] . (11)
Assuming that there is a p-additive representation U ′ with δ = 0 and a separa-
ble representation (U ′′, S′′C∪D), Ng et al. (2009) drawing upon Luce (2000, Theorem
4.4.6) for gains, show that under the above assumptions there is a unique U that is
p-additive and (U, SC∪D) is separable, that (11) holds and, with the definition (6) of
V also yields, for binary gambles with x  y,
V (x, C; y, D) = V (x)SC∪D(C) + V (y) [1 − SC∪D(C)] . (12)
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Note that if separability (10) holds not just for gains, but for all x ∈ X , then the
following stronger property holds also:
Complementarity:
SC∪D(C) + SC∪D(D) = 1. (13)
With this property, the rank dependence in (11) and (12) disappears.
1.3 Behavioral criteria to distinguish δ = 1, 0,−1
An obvious question to be addressed is how to tell whether δ = 1, 0, or −1. Theorem
4.7, p. 157 of Keeney and Raiffa (1993/1976) addresses a related question but in a
much more restricted context.1 Part II of the following Proposition was motivated by
their discussion (p. 230) of additive independence in risky money gambles defined by
(
x + x ′, 1
2





x + y′, 1
2




That together with comments by Igor Kopylov2 and Peter Wakker3 led to the following
development of Part II of Proposition 2.
It is quite easy to verify in (11) and (12) that if we impose segregation and separa-
bility without the condition that x  y, then both lead to complementarity, (13).
Lemma 1 Suppose that a p-additive representation exists, that both segregation and
separability for gains hold, that uncertain binary gambles satisfy (11) for δ = 0 and
(12) for δ = 0, and that complementarity (13) holds. If there exist consequences x  y
and events C, D such that
(x, C; y, D) ∼ (x, D; y, C). (14)
then
SC∪D(C) = SC∪D(D) = 12 . (15)
The three assumptions of the Lemma are redundant because, as shown in Luce
(2000, Theorem 4.4.4), any two implies the third.
All proofs may be found in Appendix 5.2.
Part I of the following Proposition and its proof are due to C. T. Ng, whom I thank.
Proposition 2 Suppose that a p-additive representation exists, that both segregation
and separability for gains hold, that uncertain binary gambles satisfy (11) for δ = 0
and (12) for δ = 0.
1 Brought to my attention by A.A.J. Marley, personal communication, January, 2008.
2 Personal communication, February, 2008.
3 Personal communication, March, 2008.
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2. For all x, y ∈ X, with x  e, y  e, and for all non-trivial event par-
titions {C, D} with independent replications {C ′, D′} and {C ′′, D′′},
then










(x, C ′; e, D′) ⊕ (y, C ′′; e, D′′). (17)
Part II Suppose, further, that complementarity, (13), holds for the structure and
C and D satisfy (15 ) of Lemma 1, then, for all x  x ′  y  y′, the
above two conditions are also equivalent to










(x ⊕ y, C; x ′ ⊕ y′, D). (18)
Again, the three assumptions are redundant.
Clearly, the criterion (17) is more general and easier to check empirically than (18)
which rests upon finding events that are subjectively 12 .
Despite this disadvantage, the criterion (18) does not appear to be unduly difficult
to check empirically when dealing with money lotteries with known probabilities, and
it has a very simple intuitive interpretation. If for money x ⊕ y = x + y, as seems quite
plausible, then we are speaking of 50:50 bets (x, 12 ; y, 12 ) that have the same expected
value but with a larger variance on the left than the right. Often, in the context of
choice, these are called, respectively, risky and safe lotteries. To be specific, several














































Do you feel ≺,∼, for each? I, for one, am clearly a δ = −1(≺) type for money
gambles. My guess is that people who gamble a good deal are of type δ = 1. Are there
any who are of type δ = 0? If not, then classical utility theory is not descriptive. My
guess is that these types may be domain specific: athletics, including risky ones such as
skiing and mountain climbing, may differ from finances, or from cuisine adventures.
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It is clearly important to examine one of the criteria of Proposition 2 carefully for
fairly large and varied populations to estimate, in particular, first, whether the δ = 0
class is non-empty and, second, the relative sizes of the δ = 1 and −1 subpopulations.
Very informal polling at three presentations of these results4 suggest that most aca-
demics are financially δ = −1, a few are δ = 1, and a very few, if any, δ = 0. Serious
data are needed.
2 Interpersonal comparisons of utility (IPC)
Next, an hypothesis is offered concerning interpersonal comparisons of utility for the
cases with δ = 0. Until the experiments implicit in Proposition 2 are carried out, there
can be no certainty about just how large a class of people this covers.
But first, let us consider what properties we expect a potential concept of IPC to
exhibit. We list possible demands.
2.1 Demands on a definition of IPC
Let k, l, and m be three different people and let x(k) ≈ y(l) mean that consequence
x for person k has the “same utility” as consequence y for person l. The minimal
properties that many feel such an IPC relation should satisfy are:
(i) Reflexivity:
∀x ∈ X, x(k) ≈ x(k). (19)
(ii) Symmetry:
∀x, y ∈ X, x(k) ≈ y(l) ⇔ y(l) ≈ x(k). (20)
(iii) Transitivity: If δl = 0, δk = 0, and δm = 0, then for ∀x, y, z ∈ X :
If x(k) ≈ y(l) and y(l) ≈ z(m), then x(k) ≈ z(m). (21)
Transitivity simply asserts that if one knows that (x, y) is a matching pair between
k and l and that (y, z) is a match between l and m, then by transitivity one knows that
(x, z) is a match between k and m.
Any ≈ satisfying (i–iii) is, of course, an equivalence relation.
A rather more controversial condition is whether we should expect:
(iv) Invariance under joint receipt:









4 UC Irvine, May 8, 2008; FUR, Barcelona, July 3, 2008; and Edwards Bayes Conference, Fullerton, CA,
January 8, 2009.
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The operation ⊕ is not associated with the individual because joint receipt is a
purely objective matter.
2.2 A possible definition of IPC for δ = 0
In the non-additive cases, suppose that we define interpersonal comparability (IPC) by
x(k) ≈ y(l) ⇔ Uk(x) = Ul(y). (23)
This is well defined because with δ = 0, Uk and Ul are absolute scales and so no
ambiguity arises in equating them. This contrasts with the unit ambiguity in the case
of interval or ratio scales. Of course, in practice it will not be easy to establish ≈
because it is necessary to estimate Uk and Ul , which, although possible in principle,
can often be difficult to do in practice. The key issue is establishing for any utility
estimate using standard methods exactly the value of the asymptote (±1), which can
then be used to normalize that function.
As will be shown, the equivalence relation property of ≈ follows fairly readily. But,
in general, we will not be able to satisfy invariance under joint receipt. Intuitively, the
reason is that the utility of two things simply need not “add up” in the same way for
different types of people, so in general Uk(x ⊕ x ′) = Ul(y ⊕ y′) when Uk(x) = Ul(y)
and Uk(x ′) = Ul(y′). For example (see Sect. 3), suppose that the domain X is amounts
of money, that x⊕y = x+y, and that there is a constant αk > 0 such that Uk(x) = αk x
and αl > 0 such that Ul(x) = 1 − eαl x . So Uk is additive and Ul is p-additive with
δ = −1. Choose x, x ′, y and y′ such that
Uk(x) = Ul(y) ⇔ αk x = 1 − eαl y
Uk(x ′) = Ul(y′) ⇔ αk x ′ = 1 − eαl y′,
then
Uk(x ⊕ x ′) = Uk(x + x ′) = αk(x + x ′)
and
Ul(y ⊕ y′) = Ul(y + y′) = 1 − eαl(y+y′)
= αk(x + x ′) = Uk(x ⊕ x ′).
There is nothing special about the choice of these U functions except that they are
not equal and are contained within the families discussed in Proposition 4 and its
Corollary.
Assuming that IPC is given by (23), we explore the above four properties.
123
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2.3 Two δ = 0 people
Suppose, first, that persons k and l are of the same type, i.e., have either δk = δl = 1
or δk = δl = −1. In these cases, the multiplicative representations Vk and Vl are
absolute scales and so (23) is equivalent to
x(k) ≈ y(l) ⇔ Vk(x) = Vl(y). (24)
Next, suppose that they are of different type, e.g., δk = 1 and δl = −1. Then,
matches can only arise in the common region where both utility functions exist, namely,
D−1,1 = {(x(k), y(l)) |Uk(x) = Ul(y) ∈ ]−1, 1[ }.
Thus, for (x(k), y(l)) ∈ D−1,1 we have Uk(x) = Ul(y) and so, using (6) twice,
Vk(x) − 1 = Uk(x) = Ul(y) = 1 − Vl(y). (25)
So, from (23) and (25),
x(k) ≈ y(l) ⇔ Vk(x) − 1 = 1 − Vl(y). (26)
Proposition 3 Suppose that a p-additive representation with δ = 0 exists for each
person, that both segregation and separability over gains hold, that uncertain binary
gambles satisfy (12).
I. If two individuals l and k are both p-additive with δl = δk = 1 or −1, then ≈
defined by (23) is an equivalence relation and is invariant under joint receipt.
II. If person k is of type 1, l is of type −1, and m is of either type, then for (x, y) ∈
D−1,1 the relation ≈ is an equivalence one, but it is not necessarily invariant
under joint receipt.
The above formulations have been for pure consequences, but that extends to gam-
bles f via the use of certainty equivalents, i.e., for a gamble f there is a C E( f ) ∈ X
such that f ∼ C E( f ).
3 Utility for money
3.1 General representations
This section is in response to questions raised in person by Igor Kopylov and Stergios
Skaperdas: what amount of money must a wealthier person gain or lose so it has equal
utility to that of a poorer person for gaining or losing, say, a dollar. The answer is
provided at the end of the section. To this end, we explore the special case of the
utility of increments of money. This we take to mean that for any x, y ∈ R,⊕ is a
group operator with identity 0, and U is strictly increasing.
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Proposition 4 Suppose that the assumptions of Proposition 3 are satisfied when X =
R is money amounts. Then there exists a strictly increasing function g that is additive
over ⊕ such that:
(i) If δ = 0, then U is strictly increasing and onto R and
U (x) = αg(x) (α > 0). (27)
(ii) If δ = 1, then V = 1 + U is strictly increasing, onto R+, multiplicative, (7),
and
U (x) = eαg(x) − 1 (α > 0). (28)
(iii) If δ = −1, then V = 1 − U is strictly decreasing, onto R+, multiplicative, and
U (x) = 1 − e−αg(x) (α > 0). (29)
We next consider a special case which many economists seem to believe should
hold for money, at least for rational people, namely, that money joint receipt is just
addition:
x ⊕ y = x + y. (30)
Corollary 5 Under the conditions of Proposition 4, for x ∈ R, (30) is equivalent to
g(x) = x, (31)
and so:
(i) If δ = 0, then
U (x) = αx (α > 0). (32)
(ii) If δ = 1, then
U (x) = eαx − 1 (α > 0). (33)
(iii) If δ = −1, then
U (x) = 1 − e−αx (α > 0). (34)
Note that for δ = 1, where we have (33), it is well known that U is strictly increasing
and convex, which many identify as corresponding to risk seeking behavior.
And for δ = −1, it follows from the first and second derivatives that U is strictly
increasing and concave, which corresponds to risk averse behavior.
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Assuming the functions (33) and (34) of the Corollary, let us examine what happens
when we have a weighted average of proportion a of type δ = −1 and 1 − a of type
δ = 1, with the same parameter for all people of the same type. Thus, the average is
U (x) = a (1 − e−αx) + (1 − a) (eβx − 1) .
Note that
U ′′(x) = −aα2e−αx + (1 − a)β2eβx ≷ 0

















0, a = 1
21
2
ln 9  1.1, a = 0.9
.
Observe that αx must be dimensionless, and so to have the amounts of money that are
likely to be typical, the abscissa’s must be multiplied by 10n , where n is at least 6 and
α by the reciprocal factor. Figure 1 shows for α = β = 1 plots for δ = −1 (Panel a)
and for δ = 1. The second and third rows are the averages with a = 12 and 0.9 cases
on the left and right, respectively. Row 3 focuses in on the regions where the curvature
changes. One readily sees just how misleading such average data can be.
A major open problem is how, from the data that we can collect from an individual,
do we go about estimating what amounts to the money amount corresponding closely
to the asymptote of the δ = 0 functions. This means, developing methods to estimate
α in Corollary 5 or the expression αg(x) in Proposition 4. Inroads on this kind of
problem have been developed by Abdellaoui et al. (2007).
3.2 Interpersonal comparisons for exponential utility functions
Suppose that the comparison is between two people of type δ = 1 with exponential
utility and constants αk, αl . Then





If we conjecture, as seems plausible, that when person l is wealthier than person k,
then a larger increment, y, is needed to match in utility the increment x for a poorer
person, i.e., y > x ⇔ αl < αk . Exactly what “wealthier than” means does not matter
beyond that x(k) ≈ y(l) holds only for y > x , i.e., that it takes a larger money incre-
ment y to give the wealthier person the same satisfaction, as measured by Ul , as the
increment x give the relatively poorer person, as measured by Uk . By the transitivity
123
Interpersonal comparisons of utility for 2 of 3 types of people 17
of ≈, increasing wealth corresponds to decreasing the exponent in the exponential
utility form.
Similarly, for two people of type δ = −1,





Finally, for a person 1 of type δ = 1 and person 2 of type δ = −1, we obtain for





< y < ∞,
which are needed to keep the utilities of the two amounts within the prescribed interval
] − 1, 1[ , then





In principle, one can use the behavioral criteria provided by Proposition 2 to decide,
for any person, into which category, δ = 1, 0, or −1, he or she falls. The criterion of
Part II works easily for experiments with given probabilities and money consequences,
i.e., lotteries. For general events and consequences, Part I provides a simple criterion
to test without having to estimate any subjective probabilities.
Proposition 2, Part 2, suggests, to me at least, that the class of δ = 0 people—those
who perceive utility as unbounded for both gains and for losses—may be, in fact,
empty or close to it. This bears empirical investigation.
For the δ = 0 cases, there are two disjoint classes of people corresponding to δ = 1
or δ = −1. It seems intuitive to me, although this is certainly speculative, that whether
a person exhibits unbounded gains and bounded losses (δ = 1) or bounded gains and
unbounded losses (δ = −1) correspond, respectively, to the ideas of risk seeking and
risk averse people. People for which δ = 0 can be described as risk neutral.
Interestingly, within the framework of ⊕ having a p-additive representation, the
case where utility is both bounded for gains and bounded for losses simply does not
arise. A partial extension to that case is outlined in Appendix 5.1.
For the δ = 0 case, an hypothesis was formulated as to what “interpersonal com-
parison of utility” might mean, and several of its elementary properties were derived.
These are embodied in Proposition 3. I do not see any comparable solution for the
δ = 0 subpopulation, if such people exist, because the utility function is a ratio scale,
not an absolute one.
These results were detailed for money consequences.
Three major open problems were mentioned above: (1) what is a practical method
for estimating the asymptote of utility in the δ = 0 cases? (2) how well are the money
data for individuals fit by functions of Corollary 5, in particular, assuming (30) holds
123
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separately for gains and for losses? (3) can a sensible concept of social welfare be
formulated using the absolute scales that arise when δ = 0?
A fourth open problem is raised in Appendix 5.1, namely, to develop a behavioral
theory of bounded mixed gains and losses.
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5 Appendices
5.1 Outline of a generalization to four classes of δ = 0 people
Had we taken the approach of Luce (2000, Chaps. 6 and 7), we would have worked
not with the full group 〈X,⊕, e,〉 but separately with the two Abelian semigroups
〈X (+),⊕, e,〉 and 〈X (−),⊕, e,〉 where
X (+) := {x ∈ X ∣∣x  e} , X (−) := {x ∈ X ∣∣x  e} .
The arguments about absolute scales for δ = 0 continue to hold for these two sub-




= (1, 1), (1,−1), (−1, 1), (−1,−1).
In the main body of the article, I considered only the first and fourth and for money
I assumed the same proportionality constants for gains and losses. In this generaliza-
tion, we admit different proportionality constants and, in addition, we consider two
the mixed cases: (1,−1), which is unbounded in both directions, and (−1, 1), which
is bounded from both above and below.
The fitting of several models, being conducted by Han Bleichrodt, to data from
mid-level executives collected by him, Mohammed Abdellaoui, and Hilda Kammoun
was the major motivation for considering these generalizations. Those results will be
reported elsewhere.
The major issue in developing a complete theory of this type is how to handle
mixed gains and losses, which preoccupied me, not fully successfully, in Luce (2000,
Chaps. 6 and 7).
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5.2 Proofs
5.2.1 Lemma 3
Proof Suppose that x  y and that C, D are such that
(x, C; y, D) ∼ (x, D; y, C). (38)
By segregation, this becomes when δ = 0
(x ⊕ y−1, C; e, D) ∼ (x ⊕ y−1, D; e, C)
⇔ U (x ⊕ y−1, C; e, D) = U (x ⊕ y−1, D; e, C)
By separability,
U (x ⊕ y−1)SC∪D(C) = U (x ⊕ y−1)SC∪D(D)
⇔ SC∪D(C) = SC∪D(D),
and adding complementarity (13) yields (15). For δ = 0, the parallel argument involves
U replaced by V . The conclusion is not altered. unionsq
5.2.2 Proposition 2
Proof Part I We begin by assuming that I.1 holds and prove I.2. This proof is due to
C. T. Ng. First, we consider the case where x, y are either both gains or both losses.
Thus, in both cases U (x)U (y) > 0.
Case (i) Suppose that δ = 1. Then keeping in mind that x  e, y  e and that inde-
pendent replications of {C, D} means SC∪D(C) = SC ′∪D′(C ′) = SC ′′∪D′′(C ′′),
1+ U (x ⊕ y, C; e, D)
= 1 + U (x ⊕ y)SC∪D(C)
= 1 + [U (x) + U (y) + U (x)U (y)]SC∪D(C)
= 1 + U (x)SC∪D(C) + U (y)SC∪D(C) + U (x)U (y)SC∪D(C)
> 1 + U (x)SC∪D(C) + U (y)SC∪D(C) + U (x)U (y)SC∪D(C)SC∪D(C)
= 1 + U (x)SC ′∪D′(C ′) + U (y)SC ′′∪D′′(C ′′)
+U (x)U (y)SC ′∪D′(C ′)SC ′′∪D′′(C ′′)
= [1 + U (x)SC ′∪D′(C ′)][1 + U (y)SC ′′∪D′′(C ′′)]
= [1 + U (x, C ′; e, D′)][1 + U (y, C ′′; e, D′′)]
= V (x, C ′; e, D′)V (y, C ′′; e, D′′)
= V ((x, C ′; e, D′) ⊕ (y, C ′′; e, D′′))
= 1 + U ((x, C ′; e, D′) ⊕ (y, C ′′; e, D′′)).
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So, U (x ⊕ y, C; e, D) > U ((x, C ′; e, D′) ⊕ (y, C ′′; e, D′′)) and therefore
(x ⊕ y, C; e, D)  (x, C ′; e, D′) ⊕ (y, C ′′; e, D′′).
Case (ii) For δ = 0, then
U (x ⊕ y, C; e, D)
= U (x ⊕ y)SC∪D(C)
= [U (x) + U (y)]SC∪D(C)
= U (x)SC ′∪D′(C ′) + U (y)SC ′′∪D′′(C ′′)
= U (x, C ′; e, D′) + U (y, C ′′; e, D′′)
= U ((x, C ′; e, D′) ⊕ (y, C ′′; e, D′′)).
This proves
(x ⊕ y, C; e, D) ∼ (x, C ′; e, D′) ⊕ (y, C ′′; e, D′′).
Case (iii) Suppose that δ = −1. Then using the fact that U (x)U (y) > 0 because
both are gains or both are losses,
1 − U (x ⊕ y, C; e, D)
= 1 − U (x ⊕ y)SC∪D(C)
= 1 − [U (x) + U (y) − U (x)U (y)]SC∪D(C)
= 1 − U (x)SC∪D(C) − U (y)SC∪D(C) + U (x)U (y)SC∪D(C)
> 1 − U (x)SC∪D(C) − U (y)SC∪D(C) + U (x)U (y)SC∪D(C)SC∪D(C)
= 1 − U (x)SC ′∪D′(C ′) − U (y)SC ′′∪D′′(C ′′)+U (x)U (y)SC ′∪D′(C ′)SC ′′∪D′′(C ′′)
= [1 − U (x)SC ′∪D′(C ′)][1 − U (y)SC ′′∪D′′(C ′′)]
= [1 − U (x, C ′; e, D′)][1 − U (y, C ′′; e, D′′)]
= V (x, C ′; e, D′)V (y, C ′′; e, D′′)
= V ((x, C ′; e, D′) ⊕ (y, C ′′; e, D′′))
= 1 − U ((x, C ′; e, D′) ⊕ (y, C ′′; e, D′′)).
So, U (x ⊕ y, C; e, D) < U ((x, C; e, D) ⊕ (y, C; e, D)) and therefore
(x ⊕ y, C; e, D) ≺ (x, C ′; e, D′) ⊕ (y, C ′; e, D′).
So Part I.1 implies Part I.2.
Part II We now assume that the structure satisfies complementarity, (13). Clearly,
this does not affect the equivalence of Parts I.1 and I.2. So, assuming I.1, consider
any consequences for which x  x ′  y′  y.
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For δ = 0,
(x ⊕ x ′, C; y ⊕ y′, D) ∼ (x ⊕ y, C; x ′ ⊕ y′, D)
⇔ [(U (x) + U (x ′) − (U (x) + U (y))] 1
2
+ [(U (y) + U (y′) − (U (x ′) + U (y′))] 1
2
= 0
⇔ [U (x ′) − U (y)] 1
2
+ [U (y) − U (x ′)] 1
2
= 0
⇔ [U (x ′) − U (y)] 0 = 0.
For δ = 0, then when δ = 1(−1)V is order preserving (reversing). Then using (15)
and V (e) = 1
x  y′
⇔ V (x) > (<) V (y′).
Because x ′  y, we may multiply by V (x ′) − V (y) > (<) 0 to get,
V (x)
[
V (x ′) − V (y)] > V (y′) [V (x ′) − V (y)]
⇔ V (x)V (x ′) + V (y)V (y′) > V (x)V (y) + V (x ′)V (y′)
⇔ V (x ⊕ x ′) + V (y ⊕ y′) > V (x ⊕ y) + V (x ′ ⊕ y′)
⇔ V (x ⊕ x ′)1
2
+ V (y ⊕ y′)1
2
> V (x ⊕ y)1
2
+ V (x ′ ⊕ y′)1
2
⇔ V (x ⊕ x ′, C; y ⊕ y′, D) > V (x ⊕ y, C; x ′ ⊕ y′, D)
⇔ (x ⊕ x ′, C; y ⊕ y′, D)  (≺)(x ⊕ y, C; x ′ ⊕ y′, D),
which is the criterion (18) for δ = 0.
The converses that Parts I.2 and II each imply Part I.1 are obvious because the cases




(i) Reflexivity is trivial.
(ii) Symmetry is immediate from the definition.
(iii) Transitivity:
x(k) ≈ y(l) & y(l) ≈ z(m)
⇔ Vk(x) = Vl(y) & Vl(y) = Vm(z)
⇒ Vk(x) = Vm(z)
⇔ x(l) ≈ z(m).
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(iv) Invariance under joint receipt:
x(k) ≈ y(l) & x ′(k) ≈ y
′
(l) ⇒ Vk(x) = Vl(y) & Vk(x ′) = Vl(y′)
⇒ Vk(x)Vk(x ′) = Vl(y)Vl(y′) ⇒ Vk(x ⊕ x ′) = Vl(y ⊕ y′)






(i) Reflexivity is trivial.
(ii) Symmetry:
x(k) ≈ y(l) ⇔ Uk(x) = Ul(y) ⇔ Ul(y) = Uk(x) ⇔ y(l) ≈ x(k).
(iii) Transitivity: There are two cases to consider:
Case a: δm = 1, then
x(k) ≈ y(l) ⇔ Vk(x) − 1 = 1 − Vl(y) and
y(l) ≈ z(m) ⇔ z(m) ≈ y(l) ⇔ Vm(z) − 1 = 1 − Vl(y)
⇒ Vk(x) − 1 = Vm(z) − 1
⇔ x(k) ≈ z(m),
which is transitivity.
Case b: δm = −1, then using (25)
x(k) ≈ y(l) ⇔ Vk(x) − 1 = 1 − Vl(y) and
y(l) ≈ z(m) ⇔ Vl(y) = Vm(z)
⇒ Vk(x) − 1 = 1 − Vm(z)
⇔ x(k) ≈ z(m),
which again is transitivity.
(iv) If




Uk(x) = Ul(y) and Uk(x ′) = Ul(y′)
⇔ Vk(x) − 1 = 1 − Vl(y) and Vk(x ′) − 1 = 1 − Vl(y′)
⇔ Vk(x) = 2 − Vl(y) and Vk(x ′) = 2 − Vl(y′)
⇒ Vk(x ⊕ x ′) = Vk(x)Vk(x ′)




⇔ Vk(x ⊕ x ′) = 4 − 2Vl(y) − 2Vl(y′) + Vl(y ⊕ y′)
⇔ Vk(x ⊕ x ′) − 1 = 3 − 2Vl(y) − 2Vl(y′) + Vl(y ⊕ y′)
= 1 − Vl(y ⊕ y′). (25)
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Thus, invariance under joint receipt, x(k) ⊕ x ′(k) ≈ y(l) ⊕ y′(l), does not follow in the
mixed case. unionsq
5.2.4 Proposition 4
Proof (i) δ = 0 means that the representation is additive, (4), which we repeat as
U (x ⊕ y) = U (x) + U (y), (39)
Aczél (1966, Theorem 3, p. 62) yields the general solutions to a somewhat more
general equation than (39). Indeed, in his notation that case becomes: ⊕ has a
representation of the general form
x ⊕ y = g−1[g(x) + g(y)]
where g is strictly increasing and so (27) is obvious.
(ii) δ = 1 means that V = 1 + U which has the multiplicative form (7) which, in
turn, is equivalent to
ln V (x ⊕ y) = ln V (x) + ln V (y). (40)
This with (27) yields the result.
(iii) δ = −1 means that V = 1 − U which is equivalent to
⇔ ln V (x ⊕ y) = ln V (x) + ln V (y). (41)
Taking into account that V is strictly decreasing we have ln V (x) = −αg(x). unionsq
Comment: we have used the fact that (39–41) are all the same equation, but in
different functions of the same variables.
The proof of the Corollary is immediate because
g(x + y) = g(x) + g(y)
is the well-known Cauchy equation which, under strict monotonicity and onto [0,∞[ ,
has the solutions g(x) = cx . The rest follows from this and the Proposition 4.
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